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Abstract— The key management has a fundamental role in securing group communications taking place over vast and unprotected 
networks. It is concerned with the distribution and update of the keying materials whenever any changes occur in the group membership. 
Wireless mobile environments enable members to move freely within the networks, which causes more difficulty to design efficient 
and scalable key management protocols. This is partly because both member location dynamic and group membership dynamic must 
be managed concurrently, which may lead to significant rekeying overhead. This paper presents a hierarchical group key management 
(GKM) scheme taking the mobility of members into consideration intended for wireless mobile environments. The proposed scheme 
supports the mobility of members across wireless mobile environments while remaining in the group session with minimum rekeying 
transmission overhead. Furthermore, the proposed scheme alleviates 1-affect-n phenomenon, single point of failure, and signaling load 
caused by moving members at the core network. Simulation results shows that the scheme surpasses other existing efforts in terms of 
communication overhead and affected members. The security requirements studies also show the backward and forward secrecy is 
preserved in the proposed scheme even though the members move between areas.  
Keywords-Secure group communication, group key management, group communication, host mobility 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The advance in Internet technology during the last few years and the increase of bandwidth in today networks [1,2] 
give rise to the demand for the development of new group based applications and services such as multimedia conferencing, 
interactive group games, video on demand, IP-TV, and broadcasting stock quotes [3-5]. Group based applications provide 
efficient communication by delivering a single copy of data to the networks elements such as routers and switches making 
copy as necessary for the receivers, which results in better utilization of network resources such as bandwidth and buffer 
space [6,7]. Unfortunately, such applications suffer from lack of security [8,9] since members can openly and anonymously 
join the group[10]. 
Group based applications deployed either by with IP multicast [11] or overlay multicast [12] or other means suffer from 
lack of security [8,9]. Due to the open and anonymous membership and distributed nature of group communication [10], 
the group communication services become vulnerable to various security attack such as eavesdropping, denial of service 
(DoS), masquerading attacks and others [8,13,14]. To deliver securely the content of group communication only to the 
eligible recipients, the basic security services such as secrecy, data integrity and entity authentication must be in place 
depending on the application need. The group communication secrecy requires only legitimate members can read the data 
regardless of it is disseminated into the entire network [15]. The straightforward way for provision of secrecy in a group 
communication is the use of a symmetric called Traffic Encryption Key (TEK), which shared between authorized members. 
Only legitimate group members holding the similar TEK can decrypt the group-intended data encrypted with the sender. 
However, the TEK should be updated through rekeying process due to the group membership dynamics caused with 
member joins or leaves. When an authorized member joins (or leaves) the group, the new TEK should be delivered to all 
group members to deny the access of new member (or leaving member) to previous (or future) group content to satisfy 
backward secrecy (or forward secrecy) [16,17].  
Key management scheme is a fundamental building block for preserving secrecy in a group communication. Its main 
role is to generate, update, and distribute the TEKs to all group members. The challenge of an efficient group key 
management scheme is to reduce the rekeying communication overhead and the number of affected member each time 
there is a membership change. The impact of this rekeying process can be measured by number of messages distributed to 
replace the old TEK as well as the number of members affected with this process (referred to as 1-affects-n phenomenon). 
Several attempts have been carried out to address secrecy in group communications [18-21]. However, these solutions 
remain some challenges in terms of efficiency, scalability, and performance. The number of messages can become critical 
when the rekeying process is triggered after each membership changes, which result in utilizing more network bandwidth 
and buffer space. Logical key hierarchy (LKH) scheme efficiently reduce the rekeying cost [22]. To limit the impact of 
rekeying process on the group members, some solutions organized the group members into several subgroups, which cause 
the rekeying process restricted only to a subgroup in which an event occurs [23-26]. 
Wireless networks are generally implemented using radio communication that omits the needs of wire for connection, 
which enables wireless devices to have movement between different areas of a network. Host mobility [27-29] as a unique 
property of wireless networks poses a new challenge for securing group communication; how to deliver the keys to the 
members moving from one area to another while still remaining in the session [30]. Host mobility may result in extra 
generation of keying materials in secure group communication since the member is not recognized by the new area key 
manager. Therefore, the group key management scheme must deal not only with the dynamic group membership (join or 
leave) but also with the dynamic member location (mobility). Therefore, an efficient key management is required for 
managing host mobility in order to prevent service latency while reducing rekeying latency.  
Several existing attempts have been made to address the mobility issue in secure group communication discussed in 
[20]. KMGM [31] exhibits minimum rekeying cost on member mobility however, it suffers from backward secrecy 
violation when a moving member enters into a new area. The moving member may be able to have access to the security 
information which had been generated before it joined the group in the visited area. Meanwhile, GKMW [24] has to burden 
many signaling messages. It also suffers from breach of forward secrecy in the visited areas, as the keying materials from 
each area visited by a leaving member are not updated when the moving member leaves the group communication. As a 
result, there is a need for a group key management scheme so that protects the safety of the keying materials not only when 
members join or leave the group but also when they move between areas of a network.  
This paper proposes a hierarchical key management scheme with a novel rekeying strategy for members’ mobility in 
secure group communications (called herein HISCOM) dedicated to infrastructure-based wireless mobile environments. 
This scheme moves the authentication of individual moving recipients from the domain key manager (DKM) to the area 
key managers (AKM), which alleviates single point of failure, unnecessary delays and possible bottlenecks at the DKM, 
and eventually signaling load at the core network. All the AKMs are able to generate independently the individual keys of 
each moving member without involving the trusted DKM and the origin AKM. In fact, host mobility rekeying is handled 
locally with the minimum communication overhead to reduce 1-affects-n phenomenon. A new area encryption key mobile 
owner list (AMOL) is introduced for securely tracking host mobility, and minimizing rekeying transmission overheads in 
move events. Finally, in terms of security, HISCOM maintains backward and forward secrecy not only when a change 
occurs in group membership but also when group members change their locations. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the existing group key management approaches are presented in Section 
2. The proposed scheme including host mobility key management is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, the required 
protocols for managing different events in terms of join, move, and leave are explained in details. Section 5 discusses the 
obtained results of the simulation experiments. Finally, the paper is concluded in section 6.  
2 RELATED WORK 
Traditional group key management schemes addressing rekeying over wired networks have been extensively studied 
in literature and classified into three design approaches namely, centralized, decentralized and distributed [18,21]. This 
classification is derived based on the main entities that are responsible for initiating keying materials. 
Centralized group key management involves a single entity (i.e. a group controller GC) which is responsible for 
generating, distributing and updating the TEK and auxiliary keys whenever required. In other words, it is a main reference 
for security information for all group members. Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) is one of the famous schemes in this category 
that was proposed by several research groups nearly at the same time [22,32]. The tree of keys in LKH reduces the required 
number of messages for updating the TEK induced by rekeying after membership changes to the logarithm of group 
members (log(𝑛)). Other existing approaches can be found in, [15,33-36]. 
In distributed approach (also known as contributory approach), group key management has no explicit key distribution 
centre (KDC) and all members contribute to manage the traffic key (TEK). This scheme helps to uniformly distribute the 
work load for key management and eliminates the need for central entity. Some distributed group key management schemes 
have been presented in[37,17,16,38-42]. 
In decentralized approach, a large group is split into some small subgroups so that they make some hierarchical levels. 
The responsibility of key management tasks is equally distributed between subgroup managers in each level to achieve 
scalability. This category can be classified further depending on how the TEK is distributed in the scheme into decentralized 
approach with a common TEK used for the whole group such as [43]or decentralized approach with independent TEK per 
subgroup as proposed in Iolus [44]. Although the decentralized scheme with independent TEK per subgroup alleviates the 
1-affects-n phenomenon as any changes in subgroup membership affect only the members residing at that specific 
subgroup, it suffers from computation overhead at the edge of each subgroup since data must be translated when it passes 
from one subgroup to another. Some improved schemes followed Iolus are such as [43,25,24,45-50]. 
Even though the design of efficient and scalable group key management scheme is difficult, the problem becomes 
complicated when host mobility is considered. Wireless mobile devices ranging from mobile hand held devices, notebooks, 
and PDA with wireless connectivity can be exploited for opportunistic data transfer without using any fixed network 
infrastructure. These devices are able to freely move between different sections of a network while following different 
mobility patterns [51-53]. In a naïve scenario, the move event can induce rekeying process twice since it can be treated as 
a leave in the old area and a join in the new area. Performing frequent rekeying processes will drain the resources of wireless 
devices since such devices suffer from resources scarcity [54]. Previous studies such as those discussed in literature are 
mostly designed for wired environments. Few efforts have been carried out to extent the group key management protocols 
and address host mobility issues[55,20].  
Di Pietro et al. presented LKH++ as an improved version of LKH for wireless mobile environments but it does not treat 
the mobility issue with an explicit protocol [56]. Two schemes (KTMM and WSMM) were proposed in [57] in order to 
extend the group key management to the mobile IP environment. The KTMM matches the key management tree to the 
mobile IP network topology, whereas the WSMM manages the wired and wireless areas separately using different keys in 
each area for data transmission. The group manager remains as a single point of failure in these solutions. Moreover, 
WSMM protocol requires to repeatedly update the keying materials if a member rapidly visits different areas which causes 
a cost of communication overhead in the both old area and new area. M-Iolus [58] is an enhanced version of Iolus, which 
supports mobility of members in wireless environment. However M-Iolus presents a null rekeying cost on member 
mobility, it suffers from backward secrecy violation in the visited subgroups. 
FEDRP [59] and GKMW [24] maintains a list to keep track of mobile user as well as avoiding frequent rekeying in 
visited area. FEDRP shows an expense in communication cost when the mobility rate increases.  GKMW also has to burden 
many signaling messages for managing move events. It also did not explain how to manage the leave rekeying since a 
leaving member might carry some valid area keys associated with the visited area, which cause lack of forward secrecy. 
Gharout et al. [60] proposed an adaptive key management which supports the mobility of members with a null rekeying 
cost. To handle the mobility of members, two lists are used in each area: 1) list of current members residing in the area 
(ListM), and 2) list of old members who already moved to the other areas (ListO). The drawback of this protocol is violation 
of backward secrecy since the mobile member may have access the security services information in visited area which is 
valid before the time that the member joined the group.  
3 A GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEME SUPPORTING HOST MOBILITY 
This scheme adopts a two tier hierarchical approach with a common traffic key for the whole group communication 
similar to [43,61]. The first level is the domain level, which consists of the domain key manager (DKM) for initial 
authentication procedure and managing the traffic encryption key. The second is comprised of a number of manageable 
areas where each one is managed by an area key manager (AKM) independently. The areas are indeed made by dividing 
the domain into a number of administratively scoped regions, which can be defined logically or physically. Each area 
contains a set of members subscribed to diverse group communications. The members are allowed to freely move between 
distributed areas. In this architecture, a domain can be viewed as an autonomous system which consists of a group of 
subsystem, for instance a corporate network, a multicast domain, or a wireless area. Areas can be viewed as subsystems 
which operate under the governance of bigger systems and follow the goals and objective of the bigger. The aim of placing 
members in areas is to achieve flexible and efficient management, particularly when there are changes in the group 
membership due to join, move or leave event. Therefore, the rekeying process is localized within the area and consequently 
the 1-affects-n phenomenon is alleviated. Figure 1 shows the main components involved in the scheme architecture. 
The role of DKM is to ensure the management of the TEK triggered due to join or leave events within the domain. The 
DKM is responsible to manage the domain, and closely operates with AKMs in regards to key management. The AKM is 
responsible for key management within its area and operates under control of the DKM. When an AKM receives a message 
from the DKM, it plays a role of a proxy and sends the message to the members residing in the area under its control. 
Furthermore, the management of members’ moves are delegated to AKMs to omit the burden of authentication phase at the 
DKM. The AKMs are allowed to verify moving members, update and deliver the keying materials. Each AKM maintains 
an area encryption key mobile owner list (AMOL) to keep track of moving members and reduce the need for rekeying 
when a moving member return back the area where it has previously been visited.   
All areas in the same domain use a common TEK generated by the DKM for encrypting/decrypting data flow. Therefore, 
when messages pass from one area inside the domain to another, the messages are not required to be translated. The DKM 
and the AKMs use a number of auxiliary keys in order to securely deliver the TEK and the controlling messages to the 
group members. 
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Figure 1. Placement of main components as well as join, move and leave event. 
Upon any changes in group membership, the TEK and the auxiliary key of the affected areas must be updated for the 
domain members. The new TEK is generated by the DKM and delivered to the members of the group through the AKM of 
each area. Meanwhile, the AKM of affected area updates the area keying materials and send them to the existing members 
inside the area.  
3.1 Definition and assumption 
For more simplicity, an area and a member with identity i is respectively denoted by ai and Mi. Each member has an 
individual secret key MEKi which is shared between the member and its area key manager AKMi. This key is generated by 
AKMi on receiving the join request from the member. Each member Mi also has a certified pair of public and private keys. 
Moreover, each AKM generates an area encryption key AEKi and shares it with all members residing in its jurisdiction, 
which is used to distribute the controlling messages to all group members inside area i through a secure multicast 
communication. 
The DKM shares a symmetric key referred to as Domain Encryption Key (DEK) with all the AKMs used to disseminate 
other keys as well as controlling messages via a secure multicast communication. In addition, DEK is utilized as one of the 
parameters for generating the member encryption key (MEKi) by every AKM. To communicate securely through a unicast 
channel with a specific AKM, the DKM generates a unique symmetric key called Domain_Area Key (DAKi) and shares 
with the AKMi. 
The TEK is generated by the DKM and must be shared among all members throughout the domain with assistance of 
all AKMs. At the domain level, the DKM encrypts the new TEK with either DAKi or DEK and delivers to the AKMs. At the 
area level, the new TEK is delivered to members residing in area ai protected under either each member MEKi or AEKi. The 
DEK and AEK are introduced respectively at the domain and the area level to optimize the number of rekeying messages 
whenever the TEK requires to be renewed. In this case, the DEK and AEK are used to encrypt and deliver the new TEK 
through a single multicast message in turn to the all AKMs and members within the domain instead of distributing the new 
TEK via unicast message encrypted in turn under DAKi and MEKi.  
3.2 Assumption and notation 
The design of the HISCOM scheme is based on the following assumption specified in [24].  
 The cryptography keys specified in Section 3.1are already established at initial group setup.  
 All key managers (i.e. DKM and AKM) are trustworthy and reliable and all members trust them. 
 The AKM has capability of deriving MEKi without involving the DKM. 
 Reliable multicast such as [62], [63] are in place to provide a reliable key delivery mechanism. 
 Availability of secure storage of cryptographic keys for all group communication entities. 
 Availability of secure mechanism for managing AMOL.  
For more simplicity, the notations used in this solution are described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Notation used in group key management scheme 
Symbol Significance Function 
Mi Member i Existing moving member in area i.  
ai Area i 
A set of group members using the same AEK and under 
control of AKMi. 
DKM Domain Key Manager 
The main security point, governing AKMs, generating 
and updating TEK during rekeying process. 
AKMi Area Key manager of area i 
Granting access to Mi, MEKi derivation, verifying the 
moving members, and maintenance of the AMOL and 
MemL. 
TEK Traffic Encryption Key 
Specific symmetric key for encrypting and decrypting 
group traffic. The new_TEK and old_TEK are 
respectively referred to as newly generated TEK, and the 
currently used TEK. 
MEK Member Key 
A symmetric key is used to encrypt messages between 
AKM and member. Each member Mi has its own MEK 
shown by MEKi. 
AEK Area Encryption Key 
A symmetric key used for encrypting messages sent to 
all members residing in an area.  
DEK Domain Encryption Key A symmetric key shared between DKM and all AKMs. 
AMOL 
List of departing member 
from area 
This contains the list of moving members which 
previously left the area i and moved to other areas. 
MemL 
List of current member in 
area 
This contains the list of current members residing in 
area ai. 
|A| Total number of areas The number of areas into which the domain is divided.  
ni 
Total number of members in 
area i 
The total number of members that stay in area i. 
n Number of group members  
The total number of group members have joined the 
session. 
𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖  Identity of Member i It is used by AKMi to generate MEKi. 
IDG 
Identity of the group 
communication G 
It is used by AKMi and DKM to identify particular 
services a member is subscribed to. 
{m}K 
Message m is encrypted with 
symmetric key K 
Message (or data) m which is encrypted with the 
symmetric key K. 
Text A message field 
It is a field of a message that may contain optional 
information.  
a → b Unicast transmission Delivering a message from entity a to entity b using 
unicast communication. 
A ⇒ x Multicast transmission Disseminating a message from entity a to a group of members x using multicast communication. 
|| Concatenation  Concatenates different fields of a message. 
 
3.3 Mobility key management 
In this scheme, some system security parameters initially setup by the trusted DKM is securely delivered to the AKMs 
for establishment of each group member MEK. A unique cryptography key DEK shared between the DKM and all AKMs 
is one of the chosen security parameters that enable each AKM to derive individual key of each member without involving 
the DKM and other AKMs. 
The AKM uses a key derivation function like PRF-HMAC-SHA-256 [64] to generate MEKi of a new joining member. 
While PRF-HMAC-SHA-256 provides secure pseudo random functions suitable for generating keying materials, its goal 
is to ensure the packets are authentic and not modified in transit.  To generate the MEKi, each AKM uses the Formula 1 as 
follows: 
 MEKi=PRF-HMAC-SHA-256(DEK || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG || text) (1)  
 
In Formula 1, Text contains other security parameters corresponding to the member. All AKMs require to use the same 
PRF-HMAC-SHA-256 in order to achieve a coordination throughout the domain for deriving the same MEK in all areas. 
Therefore, the AKM is able to proceed with the authentication of the visiting member and delivery of AEK without involving 
the DKM. This authentication mechanism enables all the AKMs to verify the MEK presented by a moving member. For 
instance, when member Mi moves from area i to area v, it sends a Move Notify message signed with MEKi to AKMv. AKMv 
calculates a new MEKi* using Formula 1. If the new MEKi* is equal to MEKi presented by the member Mi, the member is 
authorized to access the information of new area. The process of MEKi* derivation and comparison with MEKi is depicted 
in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Mobility key management process. 
The advantages of using this mechanism are as follows:  
(1) the bottleneck on the DKM is mitigated for managing mobility of dynamic members as the DKM is not swarmed 
with the multitude singling messages for authentication of moving members.  
(2) the resource constraint mobile devices do not undergo heavy computing process during authentication phase in the 
visited area, and  
(3) the management of moving members are distributed between all AKMs, which result in saving enormous bandwidth 
utilization during rekeying process.   
3.4 List management 
An important concept used as part of the mobility protocol design is a managing list(s) referred as Area encryption 
key Mobile Owner List (AMOL). This list enables each AKM to keep track of mobility of highly dynamic members who 
may accumulate the keying materials in the visited areas. The advantage of use of this list is to avoid frequent rekeying 
in visited areas that may cause disruption of group communication. Each area key managers in a domain securely 
maintains its own AMOL and stores information of group members that move from its managing area to another. Each 
time a member transits to a new area, the information associated with the moving member such as identity of the moving 
member 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 , identity of group communication IDG joined by the member, identity of the area the that a member is 
moving to are logged in AMOL. 
When a member enters an area, the AKM of the visited area can determine by looking up its AMOL whether the 
member is a returning member who is just moving back to the area or is a new visiting member. In a case that the member 
is moving back into the area, the AKM skips to perform the rekeying process. 
Another list called MemL maintained with area key managers contains the information of current members residing in 
the area. The information in MemL is used by key managers in a domain in order to locally handle the update of keying 
materials within the area upon any changes occur in the group membership. 
4 GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS 
In this scheme, a common TEK is used throughout the entire domain, which must be updated when there is a change in 
group membership due to join or leave in order to preserve backward and forward secrecy. The move event does not lead 
to performing the TEK rekeying process since the moving member is still valid in the session.  Moreover, join or leave 
event causes to perform the AEK update in the area where it occurs for provision of backward and forward secrecy at the 
area level. The backward secrecy is necessary in mobility event to prevent moving member from having access the content 
before the time it joined the group within the visited area. The forward secrecy is unnecessary in the old area since members 
maintain session continuity while changing point of attachment to the network. Three cases of rekeying are distinguished 
as follows: 
 Join rekeying: when a new member joins the group, a new AEKi must be generated and sent to the new member 
and the other members residing in area i. Moreover, a new TEK must be generated and distributed to the group 
members and newly joining member. The scenario is shown in action (1) in Figure 1.   
 Move rekeying: when a member changes its location from one area to another, the TEK is not changed but the 
AEKj in the new area may be changed depend on the member join time and the last AEKj update time. This 
scenario is depicted as action (2) and (3) in Figure 1.  
 Leave rekeying: when a member leaves the group, the TEK is generated and delivered to the remaining group 
members. The AEK is also updated in area which their AEKs are still valid and carried by the leaving member. 
This scenario is illustrated by action (4) in Figure 1.  
4.1 Join protocol 
In order to join the group session, a member Mi located in area ai sends a join request message signed with its private 
key to AKMi. On receipt of join request, AKMi verifies the member’s request. If the member is authorized to join the group 
session, AKMi informs the DKM and concurrently generates MEKi for the member Mi. The new MEKi is sent to member 
protected under public key of member. 
Mi→AKMi : {𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG || text}KM 
AKMi →DKM : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG || text }DAKi 
AKMi → Mi: {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG || MEKi || text }PKM 
Upon receiving the message, the DKM generates a new TEK in order to guarantee backward secrecy throughout the 
domain. The DKM sends the new TEK to AKMi manager of area i where the new member has joined the group session as 
well as other AKMs in the domain. When AKMi receives the new TEK, it generates a new AEKi to achieve backward secrecy 
at area level. AKMi sends a unicast message containing the new TEK and the new AEKi encrypted with MEKi to the new 
member and multicast this message to the other members residing in area i encrypted with the old AEKi.  
DKM ⇒ AKMi : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG || new_TEK ||text }DEK 
AKMi ⇒ Mi : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG || new_TEK || new_AEKi || text }old_AEKi 
The other AKMts in the domain distribute the new TEK to the member residing in their area t by a secure multicast 
communication as well. 
AKMt ⇒ Mt : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑡  || IDG || new_TEK || text } AEKt 
4.2 Mobility Protocol 
This protocol describes the movement of a group member Mi from area i to area v with consideration to prevent access 
to previous keying materials (backward secrecy) in the visited area. Figure 3 outlines the flow of the mobility protocol in 
algorithmic form. The following operations are executed upon the movement of a member. 
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Figure 3. Mobility protocol when a member M moves from area i to area v. 
 Member Mi informs simultaneously both its current AKMi and the target AKMv by sending a Move Notify message 
protected under Mi _Key. i.e. 
Mi→AKMi : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑣  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG ||text }MEKi 
Mi→AKMv : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑣  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG ||text }MEKi 
 On receiving the move notify message, AKMi verifies the message and informs the DKM about the member 
movement. 
AKMi →DKM : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖 || 𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑣  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG ||text }DAKi 
AKMi does not require to carry out rekeying process for AEKi in its area when the member Mi moves out since the 
moving member is still remaining in the session and therefore, the maintenance of forward secrecy is not necessary.  
 As the Mi request reaches the target AKMv, the member undergoes authentication process in order to be granted 
access.  The AKMv derives the MEKi (as stated in Section 3.3), and after that verifies whether Mi is valid member 
or not. If the member verification is successful, AKMv does the following: 
o It looks for Mi’s identity in its AMOLv. If Mi is not in the list that means this is the first time Mi visits area v 
and AKMv must check the join time 𝑡𝑀𝑖
𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛
 of Mi. If the join time 𝑡𝑀𝑖
𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛
 is after the last update time (𝑡𝐴𝐸𝐾𝑣
𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
) of 
AEKv (i.e 𝑡𝑀𝑖
𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛 >  𝑡𝐴𝐸𝐾𝑣
𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 ), AKMv needs to perform key update process to refresh the AEKv for achieving 
backward secrecy. It sends the new_AEKv to Mi encrypted with MEKi and distributes it between all residing 
members Mv in its area preferably by a multicast message. Meanwhile, information of the arrival is added to 
the MemLv.  
AKMv → Mi : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑣  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG || new_AEKv || text }MEKi 
AKMv ⇒ Mv : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑣  || IDG || new_AEKv || text } old_AEKv 
o In case that the Mi information has been already logged into the AMOL, there is no need to rekey the area 
encryption key AEKi. AKMj only requires to sends the current area key AEKv to Mi if it has been updated since 
the last visit paid by the moving member. 
AKMv → Mi : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑣  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG || AEKv || text }MEKi 
 AKMv notifies the previous AKMi and the DKM about moving Mi from area i to area v. 
AKMv →DKM : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑣 || 𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG ||text }DEK 
AKMv → AKMi : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑣 || 𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG ||text }DEK 
 AKMi subsequently removes member information from MemLi and puts it into AMOLi. 
Figure 4 shows the sequence of messages during movement of a member from area i to area v. 
MiDKM AKMi AKMv
1(a)- {Move_notify}MEKi 1(b)- {Move notify}MEKi1(c)- {Move_notify}MEKi
5(b)- {Ready_to_Rekey}old_AEKv
2- Generate 
MEKi
3- Verify Mi
alt
If Mi is not in the KMOL && the join time of Mi is 
after the AEKv update time:
5(a)- Generate 
new AEKv
6- {Welcome_notify}Mi_Key
8(a)- {Move_succeed}
8(b)- {Move_ succeed}
9(a)- Remove Mi 
from 
the MEMLi
9(b) Put Mi on 
the KMOLi
7- Put Mi on 
the MEMLv
Mv
 
Figure 4. Mobility protocol messages flow. 
4.3 Leave Protocol 
When a member Mi located in ai leaves the group session, it informs its area key manager AKMi by sending a Leave 
Notify message encrypted with MEKi. Upon receiving the message, AKMi checks the message and subsequently encrypts 
and sends it to the DKM. In order to achieve forward secrecy at area level, AKMi updates the AEKi inside the area ai. 
The DKM removes the information of departure Mi from the group session by updating its MemL. The new TEK is 
generated and distributed throughout the domain in order to guarantee forward secrecy. The DKM sends the new TEK as 
well as information of departing member Mi to all the AKMs. 
DKM ⇒ AKM : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖 || IDG || new_TEK ||text }DEK 
Upon receiving the new TEK, AKMi sends the new TEK and new AEK to residue members Mi* inside area i encrypted 
with each member MEKi* excluding the leaving member Mi. AKMi removes Mi from MemLi. 
AKMi → Mi* : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖  || 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑖
∗ || IDG || new_AEKi || new_TEK || text } MEKi* 
The leaving member might visit other areas inside the domain and accumulate information of each visited area. 
Therefore, the member Mi knows all the AEKs used in previously visited areas. Thereby, all the AEKs must be refreshed in 
each area where Mi has already visited. In other areas v (v ≠ i) where the member Mi has previously visited them or is in 
the AMOLv, AKMv must update the AEKv and send it along with the new TEK to its members in its area encrypted with the 
secret key MEKv of each member Mv. Moreover, AKMv removes information of the leaving member Mi from its AMOLv. 
vEKM } text||  new_TEK||  vAEKnew_||  GID|| 𝐼𝐷𝑀𝑣||  𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑣: { vM → vAKM 
To distribute the new TEK in the other areas p in the domain, AKMp sends a multicast message containing the new TEK 
protected under AEKp to all members residing in area p. 
AKMp ⇒ Mp : {𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑝  || IDG || new_TEK || text } AEKp 
5 RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
The proposed scheme is compared with several related schemes described in Section 2 namely, KMGM [31], GKMW 
[24], FEDRP [59], and LKH++ [56]. KMGM is a decentralized approach with independent TEK per area or subgroup, 
whereas GKMW, and FEDRP employ the decentralized approach with a common TEK for the whole group. LKH++ 
scheme was studied in the analysis as a representative of a centralized approach designed for wireless mobile environments. 
5.1 General comparison 
The generic comparison and number of rekeying signaling messages flow for each scheme are summarized respectively 
in Table 2 and Table 3. From Table 2, LKH++ and GKMW require to manage mobility events in synchronization with the 
DKM. Thus the key derivation of the TEK and the auxiliary keys require to involve the centralized DKM, which causes 
these schemes to become slower than HISCOM. This is due to the fact that the signaling messages require to traverse a 
long path to the DKM which could be located far from the AKMs. Moreover, the rekeying signaling load at the core network 
become considerable especially in dynamic mobile environments where the group members tend to change their location 
frequently, which leads to the lack of scalability. 
With cryptographically separate keys at each area in KMGM, group communication requires to be decrypted and re-
encrypted at the edge of each area hence increasing the computation overhead. Furthermore,  
KMGM requires to send a message with bigger size comprising of the auxiliary keys and the TEK in the visited area during 
move events, which result in more bandwidth consumption in comparison to HISCOM that sends only the AEK to the 
moving member in the visited area. The AKMv can derive MEKi of each moving member independent of the DKM and the 
origin AKMi in HISCOM. Thus, host mobility is managed with minimal service disruption and rekeying delays.    
The use of list for tracking moving members in HISCOM, KMGM, GKMW, and FEDRP prevent rekeying at the old 
area i during move events. Due to the lack of mobility list and using a naive mechanism for managing host mobility in 
LKH++, the rekeying messages overhead increases since the mobility is treated as a leave at the old area and a join in the 
new area.  
Table 2. HISCOM comparison with other schemes. 
Evaluation criteria LKH++ KMGM FEDRP GKMW HISCOM 
Decentralized approach      
Number of layer 1 1 2 2 2 
Common TEK per group      
DKM involved in host mobility key 
management      
Decryption/re-encryption overhead      
Localized rekeying after move      
Single point of failure      
Use of host mobility list      
Moving member authentication   -   
 
Table 3. Rekeying signaling load during mobility event. 
Scheme AKMi↔DKM AKMj↔DKM Mi↔AKMi Mi↔AKMi Mj↔AKMj Mi↔DKM 
LKH++ - - - - - 2 log 𝑛 
KMGM - - 1 1 - - 
FEDRP - - 1 2 1 - 
GKMW 2 1 2 2 <1 - 
HISCOM - - 1 <1 <1 - 
 
Table 4 presents the storage overhead incurred by the various entities in the presence of ⍺ moves between |A| areas. The 
number of residing member in area i, and the number of areas in the domain are respectively denoted by ni and |A|. Storage 
overhead determine number of keys held by the DKM, AKM, and moving member Mi. The low key held by each entity 
result in fast execution and fast accessibility.   
Table 4. Storage overhead at each entity. 
Scheme DKM AKMi Mi 
LKH++ 2log 𝑛+1 - log 𝑛+1 
KMGM - |A|+ni+1  3+2⍺ 
FEDRP 2+|A|  4+ni  3+⍺ 
GKMW 2+|A|+⍺  4+ni+⍺i 4+⍺ 
HISCOM 2+|A|  4+ni 3+⍺ 
 
LKH++ is a centralized scheme and does not employ any AKM in managing keying materials. Therefore, there is no 
storage overhead on the AKMs. KMGM adopted an independent TEK per subgroup approach, which leads to the elimination 
of the DKM. Thus, each area key manager needs to keep its own generated TEK in addition the TEKs of the other areas in 
the domain. It is due to that the AKM is enabled to decrypt the content sent from other subgroup. As a result, more storage 
complexity is added to the AKMi  as seen in Table 4. 
Moreover, the moving member needs to receive both the TEK and AEK associated with the visited in KMGM because 
each area has its own independent TEK. Thus, Mi has to incur more storage overhead. In contrary, the moving member Mi 
needs to receive only the AEK of the visited areas in HISCOM, FEDRP, and GKMW as the TEK is common throughout 
the group, which reduce the key memory required at the member Mi.  
For managing mobility event in GKMW, the DKM generates a session key and share it with the moving member and 
the visited area key manager. Thus, the storage overhead increase at the DKM, visited AKM and Mi. The number of the 
session keys that AKMi needs to hold is denoted by ⍺i. KMGM, FEDRP, GKMW, and HISCOM share a member key MEKi 
with each member residing in its area hence the storage overhead at the AKMi increase according the number of member 
residing member ni in the area i. 
5.2 Analytic model 
MListen was a tool created for a project to capture information about join or leave event of a multicast in MBone 
(multicast backbone) session. Almeroth et al. (1998) used this tool to study the characteristics of the membership dynamics 
of MBone and showed that the member arrival into the session follows Poisson process with inter arrival rate λ 
(arrival/time), and its membership duration in the session is exponentially distributed with mean duration 
1
𝜇
 time unit [65], 
[66].  
The proposed scheme divides a group communication domain into a number of areas equal with a given number like 
A. Once a group member arrives, it remains in area i for an amount of time that is exponentially distributed with mean
1
µ𝑖
, 
and then transit to another area v. Since the scheme is modeled based on an open network extension to Jackson’s theorem, 
each area is modeled as a M/M/∞ queue [67]. Figure 5 shows the state diagram of the proposed group key management 
based on Jackson’s network theorem. The arrows indicate the mean rates at which transitions occur between the areas in 
the domain. 
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Figure 5. The state diagram of the group key management. 
The state of a randomly selected member is modeled as a Markov process, where state i (𝑖 ∈  {1, … , 𝐴}) denotes a 
member residing in area i. A virtual state with index zero denotes the state of a member who is outside the group. Thereby, 
the inter arrival rate 𝜆0,𝑖 denotes a new member enters the group session from area i. Since the members are permitted to 
move between areas, let P= [𝑝𝑖,𝑗] (⩝ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  {0, … , 𝐴}) denote the transition probability among A+1 states or areas, and 
assume 𝑝𝑖,𝑖 = 0;  and 𝑝𝑖,𝑣 ≥ 0. The probability 𝑝0,𝑖 is the probability that a member arrives at area i to join the group, and 
the probability 𝑝𝑖,0 is the probability that a member leaves the group from area i. Under steady-state conditions, the arrival 
rate 𝜆𝑖 for area i=1,…,A  is obtained from the equation 1 (⩝ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  {1, … , 𝐴}) [68]. 
 𝜆𝑖 =  𝜆0,𝑖 +  ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑝𝑗,𝑖
𝐴
𝑗=1
 (2)  
A member possibly departs the group from the area 𝑎𝑖 with the probability 𝑝𝑖,0. Therefore, the leaving probability of a 
member at area 𝑎𝑖 from the group is obtained from the following equation  
 𝑝𝑖,0 =  1 −  ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑗
𝐴
𝑗=1
 (3)  
The overall rate of members joining the group communication is denoted with λ and equal with  
  𝜆 = ∑ 𝜆0,1
𝐴
𝑖=1
 (4)  
The number of members residing in area 𝑎𝑖 is denoted by 𝑛𝑖 and calculated by Formula 4. Therefore, the probability of 
exactly k members residing in area 𝑎𝑖 is obtained by Formula 14. 
 𝑛𝑖 =  
𝜆𝑖
𝜇𝑖
 (5)  
 
 𝑃(𝑛𝑖 = 𝑘) =  
𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑘!
𝑒𝑛𝑖 (6)  
 
5.3 Simulation model 
This section presents the simulation model and some results obtained through several simulation experiments. A two 
tier distribution hierarchy with distinct five areas was designed for HISCOM, GKMW, and FEDRP. One DKM within the 
first tier is responsible for governing all AKMs as well as managing the common TEK for the whole group. Each area in 
the second tier is managed by an AKM. In KMGM scheme, there is not an explicit DKM and its responsibility is delegated 
to the all existing AKMs in the group. The DKM has the main role of key management in LKH++ and entertains all events 
occurred in the session, thus, the AKMs are not involved in this matter. Therefore, all requests are sent to the DKM.  
In different experiments carried out in the simulation, the rekeying process follows a strict policy so that as soon as any 
changes occur in the group membership in terms of join or leave, the TEK is required to be updated within the entire group 
or in the affected area. Similar to the TEK, this strict policy is also applied for rekeying at area level to replace the old area 
key with the new one. The rekeying policy for a member’s move in LKH++, however, it does not provide an explicit 
mobility protocol, was considered as a leave in the old area and subsequently a join in the visited area. 
The session time was assumed for 30 minutes. All new members enter the group through any of the areas with an inter-
arrival average λ equal to 10 seconds. Once a member joins the group, its membership duration (or session sojourn time) 
follows an exponential distribution with a mean duration 1 µ⁄  time unit equal 15 minutes. In order to study the impact of 
group size variation as one of the scalability requirements for the scheme performance, both parameters the inter arrival 
rate and membership duration can respectively vary [2sec : 30sec] and [10 min: 25 min] in separate experiments The 
member remains in each area for a determined time (referred to as area dwell time), and then move to the other areas with 
the same probability of selection. In order to study the impact of members’ mobility on performance overhead, the area 
dwell time will vary. Reducing the area dwell time will lead to increasing the members’ mobility rates among areas. The 
velocity of members is set constant for all experiments, equal to 5 m/s. Table 5 summaries the simulation parameters and 
their various values used in different scenarios.  
Table 5. Simulation parameters for the experiment scenarios 
Parameters Value 
Number of Area 5 
Session time 30 min 
Inter-arrival 
10 Sec (to study the impact of inter 
arrival variation [2sec : 30sec]) 
Session sojourn time 
15 min (for study impact of membership 
duration [15 : 25] min) 
Area dwell time 
10 Sec (to study the mobility rate 
[1s:15s]) 
Velocity  5 m/sec 
 
In order to evaluate each protocol, the communication complexity as the main performance metrics for group key 
management schemes associated with each scheme was assessed in terms of the number of rekeying messages required for 
updating keying materials in the old and new area when there is a change in group membership. The importance of the 
communication overhead is because of scarce radio resources used simultaneously by many mobile users. We assumed 
that there is no difference between unicast and multicast messages. In addition, we studied the 1-affects-n phenomenon of 
each simulated scheme. Three parameters such as inter-arrival time, member sojourn time, and area dwell time have been 
changed to study the impact of group size and the mobility rate on HISCOM in what relates to efficiency in terms of 
rekeying communication overhead, and scalability in terms of 1-affects-n behavior.   
1. Impact of the group size: The scalability size of the proposed scheme is studied by changing the value of two 
controlling parameters in the simulation: the average inter arrival of members into the group session, and the 
average membership duration of members in the session. First, the average inter arrival value was varied in the 
simulation experiments from 2 second to 30 seconds while other simulation parameters were kept constant. The 
small number of inter arrival time resulted in a high population in the group about 600, whereas the number of 
group members achieves an average of 60 when the inter arrival time reaches 30 seconds. The average of leave 
and move also follow the group population trends.   
The average membership duration (i.e. session sojourn time) as the other controlling parameter can influence the 
size of the group. The membership duration value varied from 10 minutes to 25 minutes [10min : 25min]. The 
membership duration (i.e. session sojourn time) is meant the number of time units (in minutes) after which a 
member leaves the session. The membership duration is the reverse of leave rate so that the increase of 
membership duration results in reduction of leave rate and consequently increases of the remaining members in 
the session. The average rate of leave declines with increase of membership duration from about 230 to 50. While 
the join rate keeps steady about 330, the move event gradually increases.  
2. Impact of the movement rate: To study the impact of mobility rate variation, the area dwell time varies between 
range from 1 second to 15 seconds ([1s : 15s]) in the simulation experiments. The area dwell time can be called 
the mobility period, which is the number of time units (in seconds) after which a member changes its location. 
The mobility period is the reverse of mobility rate (equal to 
1
mobility rate
) which is the average number of moves 
on time unit.  
When the mobility period value is equal to 1 second, the average rate of moves in the session reaches to about 
19000. It gradually declines to achieve an average about 5900 inter moves in the session when the mobility period 
reaches to 15 seconds. In spite of mobility rate variation during the session, the rate of joins and leave remain 
steady respectively about 172 and 88. 
5.3.1 Communication overhead 
This requirement satisfies the bandwidth consumption of the wireless networks and devices. The high number of 
messages transmitted either by unicast or multicast during the performing rekeying process consume enormous network 
bandwidth, which result in delays in distributing the keying materials and disruption in the group communication service. 
It can clearly be observed from Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 that LKH++ induces a higher number of rekeying 
messages than the others due to the lack of a protocol intended for managing the move events. Whenever any move occurs 
in the group, LKH++ affects the both old and visited area as it needs to perform rekeying process in the previous area as 
well as the visited area to achieve respectively forward and backward secrecy. Whereas other schemes induce null rekeying 
in the previous area due to the use of the mobility list and keeping the track of moving members.  
Lack of strategy for handling the move event significantly increases the rekeying messages overheads particularly in 
the group with big size. Figure 6 and Figure 7 obviously depict the ratio of rekeying messages has increased when the 
group population grows up by increase of either inter arrival rate or membership duration.  
  
 
Figure 6. Impact of inter arrival variation on rekeying message overhead. 
HISCOM, KMGM, FEDRP, and GKMW introduced the use of mobility list as to record the track of moving members 
such that the old area induces null communication overhead in move event and the visited area makes minimum 
communication overhead depending on the scheme design. Using this strategy results in improving bandwidth efficiency 
of the system while satisfying backward secrecy. Nevertheless, GKMW impose higher communication overhead than the 
others as depicted in Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure8. This is due to the required signaling messages for establishment of 
session mobility key between the moving member and the destination AKM. The session mobility key is generated by the 
DKM on the receipt of request from the AKM of the old area. The DKM requires to deliver this key to the visited area AKM, 
and the moving member through its old AKM. The session mobility is used for encryption/decryption messages between 
the moving member and the visited AKM. 
FEDRP uses similar strategy for managing member mobility to GKMW. While GKMW uses a symmetric cryptography 
key for member authentication in the visited area, FEDRP uses asymmetric cryptography key for authentication of the 
moving members, which result in huge computation overhead at the member side and delay in obtaining service in the 
visited area. Furthermore, FEDRP empties the mobility list whenever an event occurs in the area. Thus, when a member 
returns back to an area where has already been visited, the AKM may not be able to find the track of moving back member 
as the mobility list has previously been emptied due to a change in area membership. The AKM treats the returning back 
member like a member who visits the area for the first time. Therefore, the communication overhead of FEDRP 
significantly increases, as the keying materials frequently require to be updated.   
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 Figure 7. Impact of membership duration variation on rekeying message overhead. 
The increase of the group size and the mobility period has a minimum influence on HISCOM and KMGM as the 
communication overhead remains low in comparison to the other solutions. This is because of the authentication 
mechanism used to verify the moving member in the visited area, which minimizes the signaling messages and avoids 
initiating extra rekeying process in move events. Since KMGM used an independent TEK per each area, the TEK 
corresponding to the visited area along with the AEK of the visited area must be sent to the moving member, which result 
in the size of messages sent to the member becoming bigger in contrast with other decentralized solutions. HISCOM, 
GKMW, and FEDRP need to send only the AEK of the visited area as the TEK is common for all areas. Thereby, rekeying 
process can become a hurdle for KMGM in a group with large size as the system bandwidth is enormously consumed by 
signaling messages. 
 
 
Figure 8. Impact of mobility rate variation on rekeying message overhead. 
5.3.2 1-affects-n phenomenon 
The 1-affects-n phenomenon refers to the number of group members affected by a rekeying process due to any changes 
in the group membership. The high number of members involved in rekeying process on each event becomes a hurdle for 
the scheme to scale the scope of key management to very large group. Due to the intuitive characteristics of wireless devices 
in terms of wireless bandwidth limitation, high affected members consume enormous wireless resources which causes 
failure in receiving the new update of keying materials by some group members. 
It can easily be seen from Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11, the high number of members are affected on each event in 
LKH++. The reason is LKH++ does not provide any protocol for move event and treats it as a leave in the old area and a 
join in the visited area thus, the entire group members are influenced with such an event twice. The average number of 
member affected by rekeying processes increases in this scheme especially when the group size grows up as depicted in 
Figure 9, and Figure 10. Since the number of affected member is proportional with logarithm of group members, with 
increase of group population the average of affected members rises up in the group. Therefore, LKH++ cannot scale to 
large group size.  
HISCOM affects minimum group members by the update process of keying materials even when many members join 
the group and increase the group population as depicted in Figure 9. While, FEDRP, GKMW, and KMGM show high 
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overhead on 1-affects-n phenomenon when the group size grows up particularly in situation the rate of inter arrival is fallen 
between time period [2s : 10s]. Thereby, the scheme scalability for FEDRP, GKMW, and KMGM becomes a hurdle for 
groups in which members enter with a short inter arrival time as the size of groups sharply grows up. Although when the 
rate of inter arrival increases, HISCOM, GKMW, and KMGM involve the minimum number of members in rekeying 
process.  
 
Figure 9. Impact of inter arrival variation on the average number of affected member. 
The same strategy adopted by all schemes except LKH++ (i.e. the use of mobility list for keeping track of moving 
members) eliminates needs of performing rekeying process in the old area when a moving member returns back, which 
reduces the 1-affects-n phenomenon overhead in all solutions more than LKH++. In FEDRP, the average of members 
affected on each event is fairly higher than HISCOM, KMGM, and GKMW. This is due to the fact that the mobility list is 
emptied whenever any membership changes occur in each area. Thus, in some cases that a moving member returns back 
to an area where he has previously visited, and the mobility list of the area has been emptied during the absence of the 
moving back member causes unnecessary rekeying process, which affects all residing members in the visited area. 
 
Figure 10. Impact of membership duration variation on the average number of affected member. 
Figure 11 depicts a considerable reduction for the 1-affects-n behavior in HISCOM particularly in highly dynamic 
environments in compare to the other solutions. It is because that The group members managed by HISCOM are 
considerably less affected with the group membership changes because the rekeying process is performed in the visited 
area when a member changes its location as long as the visiting member is not on the mobility list or its join time is after 
the last update time of keying materials in the visited area. Other solutions such as FEDRP, and GKMW carry out rekeying 
process if the member is not on the mobility list, which result in likely more updating keying materials as shown in Figure 
10 and consequently more members are affected on each event as shown in Figure 11.  
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 Figure 11. Impact of mobility period variation on the average number of affected member. 
5.4 Security analysis 
The proposed scheme precludes any eavesdropping opportunity when a moving member change its location. The 
provision of confidentiality with respect to backward secrecy is achieved with performing rekeying process in the visited 
area, which result in the moving member being unable to discover the service security information before the time it joined 
the group in the visited area.  
Preserving forward secrecy in the area where a member is moving out in order to enter another destination within a 
domain is certainly pointless because the member still remains in the session, in spite of changing its location. As a result, 
the mobility protocol does not require to maintain forward secrecy in the old area. Nevertheless, the leave protocol provides 
this option in the area which leave event occurs as well as all areas of which the leaving member holds their area encryption 
keys as long as these AEKs are still valid on the occurrence of leave event. All AKMs corresponds to these areas need to 
perform updating process for keying materials. Therefore, the forward secrecy requirement is achieved when any leave 
occur in the group throughout the domain. 
Lemma 1: let D,  AKMk, and Ml respectively be the domain, the AEK used in area k, and an expelled member from area 
i. There is 
 ∃𝑎𝑘 ⊂ 𝐷| 𝑀𝑙 ∈ 𝐴𝑀𝑂𝐿𝑘 ⇒  𝐴𝐸𝐾𝑘𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑. (1)  
Proof 
When Ml arrives in a new area, it receives the keying material (AEK) of the new area. The AEK of the old area and the 
TEK throughout the domain are not updated (Section 4.2). Thus, the expelled member knows all AEKs of areas where it 
has already visited. If A= {a1, a2, …, aj} is assumed as all areas visited by Ml, the expelled member is able to decrypt all 
messages sent to A since it knows AEKs of areas in A. 
When Ml is expelled from area i, the DKM informs all area key managers that Ml has been expelled from the group and 
thereby the new AEKs are generated in areas where equation 2 is verified. The area key manager sends the new AEK to 
each member remaining in area i encrypted with the member key MEKi* of member Mi* (AKMi ⟶Mi* (i≠ l) : {new_ AEKi 
} MEKi*). Thereby, each remaining valid member Mi* in area would be able to decrypt the new AEK using its MEKi*. The 
expelled member would not able to access the new AEK since its associated member key is not used by AKMi to encrypt 
the new AEK. 
For each area k where equation 2 is verified, to distribute the new AEK, AKMk sends to each member Mk (k≠ l) remaining 
in its area the new AEK encrypted with MEKk associated with each member. The MEKl of expelled member is excluded in 
encryption process. Therefor, ml will not be able to access to the new AEK in area k. 
An intruder cannot access to the new TEK, and hence to the content, since it does not know any member key MEKk of 
a remaining legitimate member, and thereby cannot decrypt the new AEK. It also does not know any AEKt of areas it has 
not visited yet. Therefore, the intruder is disable to have access to the new TEK in the group, as he does not know the AEK 
of every areas. 
The impersonation attacks are also impossible as the area key manager and the moving members mutually authenticate 
each other on every mobility events. The AKM verifies each member against the member key MEK, which is derived using 
the security parameters generated and shared by the trusted DKM and the information associated with the specific member. 
Table 6 provides a comparison between HISCOM, KMGM, FEDRP, GKMW, and LKH++ in terms of backward 
secrecy and forward secrecy. From the Table 6, all schemes except KMGM preserve backward secrecy when a join event 
or move event occurs in the session. In KMGM, if authentication phase for a moving member in the target area proceeds 
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successfully, the member receives the keying materials of the visited area. In some cases, the moving member may have 
access to security information of the visited area which is valid before the time the moving member joined the group, which 
impose an expense of backward secrecy violation.  
GKMW breaches forward secrecy in the leave events since the rekeying process is only performed in the area where 
the leave occurs, while the leaving member may carry the valid keying materials associated with the areas which has already 
been visited. LKH++ performs unnecessary rekeying process for provision of forward secrecy in the old area since it treats 
move event as a leave in the old area and a join in the new area despite of the moving member is still remaining in the 
session.     
Table 6. Comparison of rekeying TEK and AEK in move event between different schemes. 
Scheme Forward secrecy Backward secrecy 
 Leave Move Join Move 
LKH++     
KMGM     
FEDRP     
GKMW     
HISCOM     
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 Designing a group key management scheme in wireless mobile environment becomes more complicated since wireless 
devices can move freely between areas and subnets of networks, which causes more difficulty in key management and 
member authentication. In this paper, a new scheme HISCOM has been proposed to improve the key management 
performance in wireless mobile environments. It considered backward secrecy where moving group members dynamically 
changes their locations while seamlessly maintaining the session. HISCOM used a new rekeying strategy based on member 
join time and area key update time, and AMOL for effectively performing key management and authentication phase, as 
well as avoiding renewing the TEK respectively during move events. HISCOM adopted decentralized approach with a 
common TEK for all areas to localize rekeying, and alleviate 1-affects-n phenomenon and path decryption/encryption 
overheads. By delegating the authentication phase of moving members to the intermediate AKMs, the DKM is given 
scalability and preserved from bottleneck as the signaling loads reduce at the core domain. The HISCOM was modeled by 
analytical formal method for evaluating the communication cost and 1-affects-n phenomenon. Simulation results depicted 
HISCOM considerably reduced rekeying overhead and increased the scalability of key management with decreasing the 
affected members on each event while maintaining backward secrecy in move events.       
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